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Unfair and Unintended:  
The Tax-Exempt Organization Blocker Loophole 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Politicians love to attack the Internal Revenue Code (the 
“Code”). Arguably, it is too long, too complicated, and full of 
loopholes that benefit the wealthy. Even tax lawyers and certified 
public accountants who have devoted their professional lives to 
studying tax law and tax accounting cannot easily understand the 
Code’s complexity. Indeed, even judges, whom society esteems to be 
the final authority on all things legal, have an extraordinarily difficult 
time parsing the Code’s complicated terminology. While referring to 
a particular Subchapter K Code section, one judge famously stated, 
“Surely, a statute has not achieved ‘simplicity’ when its complex 
provisions may confidently be dealt with by at most only a 
comparatively small number of specialists who have been initiated 
into its mysteries.”1 
Some of the Code’s greatest “mysteries” live in the world of 
international taxation. The Code is full of complicated tax rules for 
various types of entities, including tax-exempt organizations, which 
earn income abroad. The Code is littered with loopholes. In addition 
to the potential lost revenue from legally exploited loopholes, an IRS 
consultant estimated that the United States Treasury loses $70 
billion annually in revenue due to offshore tax evasion.2 
Tax-exempt organizations are able to use the foreign blocker 
corporation loophole in conjunction with their hedge fund 
investments to decrease their potential tax liability. This Comment 
argues that tax-exempt organizations should not be able to receive 
tax-free dividends from foreign blocker corporations that invest in 
hedge funds for three reasons: (1) the blocker corporation is an 
unintended consequence of the unrelated business taxable income 
(“UBTI”) rules; (2) the blocker corporation structure fails a 
substance over form analysis; and (3) closing the loophole will 
provide increased revenue to the United States Treasury. 
 
 1. Foxman v. Comm’r, 41 T.C. 535, 551 n.9 (1964). 
 2. Samuel D. Brunson, Repatriating Tax-Exempt Investments: Tax Havens, Blocker 
Corporations, and Unrelated Debt-Financed Income, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 225, 227 n.7 (2012). 
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This Comment is divided into several parts. Part II discusses tax-
exempt organizations and their relation to hedge funds. Part III 
discusses the foreign blocker corporation and passive foreign 
investment companies (“PFICs”). Part IV discusses the reasons why 
Congress should close the blocker loophole. Part V provides several 
suggestions on how the loophole might be wholly or partially closed: 
(1) amending the § 1291 PFIC rules; (2) amending the § 512 UBTI 
exceptions; (3) increasing the § 4940 and § 4944 taxes on private 
foundations; and (4) applying the § 4940 and § 4944 proposed 
changes to all tax-exempt organizations by amending § 509. Part VI 
concludes. 
II. TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS AND HEDGE FUNDS 
A. Tax-Exempt Organizations in a Nutshell 
Generally, if an organization meets the requirements of a tax-
exempt organization under § 501 of the Code, then it will be exempt 
from federal income tax.3 The most famous tax-exempt 
organizations are § 501(c)(3) organizations, which include public 
charities (e.g., the Red Cross), operating foundations, and private 
foundations (e.g., the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation).4 All 
§ 501(c)(3) organizations are exempt from federal income tax,5 and 
a donor’s contribution to a § 501(c)(3) organization can be deducted 
from the donor’s federal tax liability.6 
Although data is extremely limited regarding which tax-exempt 
organizations use the foreign blocker corporation loophole, due to 
the costs associated with complex tax structuring, there is good 
reason to believe that many asset-rich, tax-exempt organizations 
utilize the blocker corporation scheme, including public charities, 
university endowments, churches, and private foundations.7 
 
 3. I.R.C. § 501 (2012). 
 4. See id. § 501(c)(3). 
 5. Id. § 501(a). 
 6. Id. § 170(a). 
 7. See STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAX’N, 110TH CONG., PRESENT LAW AND ANALYSIS 
RELATING TO TAX TREATMENT OF PARTNERSHIP CARRIED INTERESTS AND RELATED ISSUES, PART II 
(Comm. Print 2007) [hereinafter TAX TREATMENT II]. 
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B. The Taxation of Tax-Exempt Organizations 
1. UBTI 
In 1950, Congress passed rules that imposed a tax on a tax-
exempt organization’s unrelated business income.8 Before the rules 
were created, some tax-exempt organizations started to look too 
commercial in nature, and the government feared that tax-exempt 
organizations could distort the market by selling goods at a below-
market price while still obtaining a market rate of return due to their 
tax-exemption.9 Under the Revenue Act of 1950, Congress passed 
rules that placed an income tax on any part of a tax-exempt 
organization’s income that met the following requirements: (1) 
income received was from a trade or business; (2) the trade or 
business was “regularly carried on” by the tax-exempt organization; 
and (3) the trade or business was not “substantially related” to the 
tax-exempt organization’s purpose (income that met these 
requirements is referred to as unrelated business taxable income or 
UBTI).10 Certain exceptions were included in the UBTI Rules. For 
example, dividends, interest, royalties, and other passive types of 
income were exempt from the UBTI regime.11 
In the Tax Reform Act of 1969, Congress passed more 
comprehensive rules relating to debt-financed income and indicated 
that interest, dividends, rents, royalties, and certain other types of 
payments from debt-financed transactions unrelated to a tax-exempt 
organization’s purpose would also be taxed as UBTI.12 The 
provisions targeting debt-financed income were primarily aimed at 
 
 8. See Brunson, supra note 2, at 230. 
 9. Id. 
 10. See I.R.C. §§ 511–13 (2012). 
 11. Id. § 512(b). Additionally, there are other exceptions to the UBTI rules, but those 
exceptions are inapplicable to this Comment.  
Other exemptions from the unrelated business income tax are provided for activities 
in which substantially all the work is performed by volunteers, for income from the 
sale of donated goods, and for certain activities carried on for the convenience of 
members, students, patients, officers, or employees of a charitable organization. In 
addition, special unrelated business income tax provisions exempt from tax certain 
activities of trade shows and State fairs, income from bingo games, and income from 
the distribution of certain low-cost items incidental to the solicitation of charitable 
contributions.  
TAX TREATMENT II, supra note 7, at 10–11. 
 12. See Brunson, supra note 2, at 232–35. 
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stopping sale-leaseback transactions, which allowed tax-exempt 
organizations to use their tax-exempt status to distort the market in 
ways other than selling goods at a below-market price for a market 
rate of return. For example, in a typical sale-leaseback transaction, a 
tax-exempt organization would borrow money to finance a real or 
personal property purchase from a private individual or company.13 
The seller would normally pay a long-term capital gain tax on the 
sale, and the tax-exempt organization would then rent the property 
back to the seller. Under this scheme, tax-exempt organizations were 
able to charge a below-market rent price to the seller but still receive 
a fair market rental payment because the rental income was not 
taxable under the UBTI exceptions prior to 1969.14 
After the Tax Reform Act of 1969, the exceptions to UBTI, 
including those for dividends, interest payments, and royalties, were 
not allowed if the income was derived from a debt-financed 
investment, otherwise known as a leveraged investment.15 
2. Excise taxes 
In addition to the UBTI regime, some tax-exempt organizations 
are also subject to excise taxes. Currently, tax-exempt private 
foundations are subject to a 2% excise tax on their investment 
income under § 4940(a) of the Code. Section 4940(a) reads: 
There is hereby imposed on each private foundation which is 
exempt from taxation under section 501(a) [26 U.S.C. § 501(a)] for 
the taxable year, with respect to the carrying on its activities, a tax 
equal to 2 percent of the net investment income of such foundation 
for the taxable year.16 
In determining a private foundation’s net investment income for the 
current taxable year, the IRS considers the foundation’s income from 
interest, dividends, rents, and other passive income sources.17 
 
 13. See, e.g., Comm’r v. Brown, 380 U.S. 565 (1965) (involving a sale-leaseback 
transaction dealing with tangible property). 
 14. STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAX’N, 110TH CONG., PRESENT LAW AND ANALYSIS 
RELATING TO SELECTED INTERNATIONAL TAX ISSUES 46–47 (Comm. Print 2007) [hereinafter 
SELECTED INTERNATIONAL TAX ISSUES]. 
 15. See TAX TREATMENT II, supra note 7, at 10–11. 
 16. I.R.C. § 4940(a) (2012). 
 17. See I.R.S. Ruling, IRM 7.27.14.4 (Feb. 26, 1999), available at 
http://www.irs.gov/irm/part7/irm_07-027-014.html. 
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Additionally, § 4944 of the Code imposes a 10% tax on 
investments that may jeopardize a private foundation’s tax-exempt 
purpose. The statute reads: 
If a private foundation invests any amount in such a manner as to 
jeopardize the carrying out of any of its exempt purposes, there is 
hereby imposed on the making of such investment a tax equal to 10 
percent of the amount so invested for each year (or part thereof) in 
the taxable period. The tax imposed by this paragraph shall be paid 
by the private foundation.18 
The Treasury Regulations (“Regulations”) imply that foundation 
managers have great discretion regarding the transactions their 
private foundations engage in, and a transaction is only considered 
“jeopardizing” to the foundation if it is made without ordinary 
business care. The Regulations state that a transaction is 
jeopardizing if 
it is determined that the foundation managers, in making such 
investment, have failed to exercise ordinary business care and 
prudence, under the facts and circumstances prevailing at the time 
of making the investment, in providing for the long- and short-term 
financial needs of the foundation to carry out its exempt 
purposes.19 
As the law currently stands, all tax-exempt organizations are 
subject to the UBTI regime, but only private foundations are subject 
to excise taxes.20 
C. Tax-Exempt Organizations as Domestic Hedge Fund Investors 
1. Hedge funds in a nutshell 
Hedge funds are large funds that invest primarily in liquid 
securities and other assets. They are “actively managed investments 
that pool investors’ capital in order to acquire, own, and trade one or 
more of securities, commodities, and financial products.”21 Hedge 
fund investors have generally been one of three types: “high net-
worth individuals who are subject to U.S. tax; foreign persons who 
 
 18. I.R.C. § 4944(a)(1). 
 19. 26 C.F.R. § 53.4944-1 (2013). 
 20. See I.R.C. § 4944(a)(1). 
 21. Brunson, supra note 2, at 236. 
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are not otherwise subject to U.S. tax; and U.S. institutional investors 
(such as charities and private and government pension funds) that 
are tax-exempt under U.S. tax rules.”22 
As of 2006, almost 55% of worldwide hedge funds were 
registered offshore, meaning that the funds were registered in 
different countries from where the fund was based.23 Nearly all of 
the offshore funds, 92%, were registered in low-tax jurisdictions, 
including the Cayman Islands, the British Virgin Islands, Bermuda, 
and the Bahamas.24 Of the remaining worldwide hedge funds, 48% 
were registered in the United States, mostly in Delaware.25 
2. Taxation of passed-through profits from hedge funds 
In the United States, hedge funds are typically taxed as 
partnerships under federal income tax law.26 When a hedge fund is 
structured as a partnership, the fund’s profits and losses are passed 
through to its members or investors.27 Under the UBTI rules, 
income passed through from the hedge fund to the tax-exempt 
organization will likely be UBTI because it will be income received 
from a trade or business that is not “substantially related” to the tax-
exempt organization’s purpose and is “regularly carried on” by the 
tax-exempt organization.28 Even if all the income is not classified as 
UBTI, then at least the portion of the profits that result from 
leveraged investments will be taxed as UBTI.29 
The diagram below shows a simplified version of how a tax-
exempt organization invests in a hedge fund. 
  
 
 22. TAX TREATMENT II, supra note 7, at 2. 
 23. Id. at 8. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. 
 26. See INVESTORS’ COMMITTEE TO THE PRESIDENT’S WORKING GROUP OF FINANCIAL 
MATTERS, PRINCIPLES AND BEST PRACTICES FOR HEDGE FUND INVESTORS 41 (2009) [hereinafter 
PRINCIPLES AND BEST PRACTICES]. 
 27. Id. 
 28. See I.R.C. §§ 511–13 (2012). 
 29. See Brunson, supra note 2, at 230–31; see also I.R.C. § 514(a). 
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Since profits from hedge funds will almost certainly trigger UBTI, a 
tax-exempt organization uses the blocker corporation loophole to 
earn a tax-free return on its investment. 
III. BLOCKER CORPORATIONS AND PASSIVE FOREIGN INVESTMENT 
COMPANIES 
A. Taxing Corporations in General 
 Unlike partnerships, corporations do not pass through profits 
and losses to their shareholders.30 Instead, earnings are effectively 
taxed twice: once at the corporate level and again when dividends are 
paid to shareholders.31 Under this tax scheme, it becomes clear why 
hedge funds are organized as partnerships—to allow their investors 
to avoid double taxation. 
 Given the pass-through tax structure associated with 
partnerships that triggers UBTI and the double taxation of 
corporations, it would seem that a tax-exempt organization that 
wants to invest in a hedge fund is presented with only two options, 
both requiring some tax to be paid by the organization. Either the 
organization can be a partner in a partnership and be taxed on UBTI, 
 
 30. See I.R.C. § 11. 
 31. See id. §§ 11, 301. 
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or the organization can be a shareholder of a corporation and receive 
relatively smaller tax-free returns because of an initial corporate tax 
on earnings as high as 35%.32 
 However, what if the tax-exempt organization could receive its 
tax-free dividend on an undiminished return because of a 0% 
corporate tax rate? Such a situation could not exist if the corporation 
was set up in the United States,33 but it certainly could exist, and 
indeed it does, if the corporation is set up in the Cayman Islands or a 
similar tax jurisdiction.34 Meet the foreign blocker corporation.35 
B. The Foreign Blocker Corporation 
In order to prevent a hedge fund from passing UBI to its tax-
exempt partner, the income is instead passed from the hedge fund to 
a blocker corporation.36 UBTI does not pass through from 
corporations to shareholders. Thus, “if tax-exempt organizations 
hold potentially [UBTI]-producing investments through a 
corporation, the . . . look through rule does not apply, and 
dividends paid by the corporation to the tax-exempt investors 
generally are excluded from the investors’ unrelated business taxable 
income.”37 The diagram below shows a simplified blocker 
structure.38 
 
 32. See id. § 11. 
 33. See id. 
 34. See TAX TREATMENT II, supra note 7, at 8. 
 35. “Generically, a blocker or stopper is an entity inserted in a structure to change the 
character of the underlying income or assets, or both, to address entity qualification issues, to 
change the method of reporting, or otherwise to get a result that would not be available without 
the use of more than one entity.” Willard B. Taylor, “Blockers,” “Stoppers,” and the Entity 
Classification Rules, 64 TAX LAW. 1, 1 (2011). Although the blocker corporation can be used in 
other contexts, this Comment specifically uses the terms “blocker corporation,” “blocker 
structure,” and “blocker loophole” to reference only a tax-exempt organization’s use of such a 
structure in a non-tax or low-tax jurisdiction. 
 36. See PRINCIPLES AND BEST PRACTICES, supra note 26, at 42. 
 37. See TAX TREATMENT II, supra note 7, at 4. 
 38. Most blocker corporation schemes are considerably more complex than the one 
depicted, but the basic graphic shown accurately represents the benefits blocker corporations 
provide to tax-exempt investors. Often, tax-exempts are simply a player in what is called a 
“master-feeder” structure, which “combines a ‘master fund,’ often an investment company 
exempt from the Investment Company Act, domiciled in a low tax or no tax jurisdiction such as 
the Cayman Islands, with an offshore ‘feeder fund,’ another exempted company domiciled in the 
same jurisdiction as the master fund, and an onshore LLC or LP, which is also a ‘feeder fund.’ 
Investors subscribe to the feeder funds, which ‘feed’ or ‘upstream’ their assets to the master 
fund, and the combined pool of assets is managed at the master-fund level. By investing in the 
offshore feeder, non-U.S. investors usually avoid being subject to U.S. taxes and the reporting 
requirements that arise when non-U.S. investors generate taxable income that is effectively 
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Understandably, the blocker structure has become a preferred 
investment model for tax-exempt organizations that wish to invest 
in hedge funds.39 Not only will tax-exempt investors not have to pay 
tax on a dividend pay-out, but that pay-out will also not be 
diminished by a corporate tax rate since the corporate tax rate in the 
Cayman Islands is 0%.40 
C. PFIC Rules, Tax-Exempt Organizations, and Blocker Corporations 
U.S. taxpayers that are shareholders of a PFIC are taxed on the 
PFIC’s income under a different regime that is beyond the scope of 
this Comment.41 A PFIC is a foreign corporation that meets one of 
 
connected to the conduct of a trade or business within the United States. For U.S. tax-exempt 
investors, the offshore feeder fund acts as a ‘blocker company’ and may enable these investors to 
avoid being subject to Unrelated Business Taxable Income (‘UBTI’). This structure enables tax-
exempt investors to participate in investment partnerships that use leverage as part of their 
investment strategy.” PRINCIPLES AND BEST PRACTICES, supra note 26, at 41–42 (internal 
quotation marks and citations omitted). 
 39. See, e.g., id. at 41–42. 
 40. Cayman Islands Highlights 2012, DELOITTE (2012), http://www.deloitte.com/ 
assets/Dcom-Global/Local%20Assets/Documents/Tax/Taxation%20and%20Investment%20  
Guides/2012/dttl_tax_highlight_2012_Cayman%20Islands.pdf. 
 41. “Alternative sets of income inclusion rules apply to U.S. persons that are shareholders 
in a passive foreign investment company, regardless of their percentage ownership in the 
company. One set of rules applies to passive foreign investment companies that are ‘qualified 
electing funds,’ under which electing U.S. shareholders currently include in gross income their 
respective shares of the company’s earnings, with a separate election to defer payment of tax, 
subject to an interest charge, on income not currently received. A second set of rules applies to 
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the following tests: (1) 75% or more of the corporation’s gross 
income is passive income, such as dividends, interest, royalties, 
rents, and annuities (the “income test”); or (2) the average 
percentage of assets that the corporation holds that produce passive 
income or are held for the production of passive income during a 
taxable year is at least 50% (the “asset test”).42 Many blocker 
corporations will be classified as PFICs because they will almost 
certainly meet either the income or asset tests (probably both in 
most cases).43 
Prior to 1998, there was some confusion regarding how the PFIC 
rules applied to tax-exempt organizations.44 In 1998, the Treasury 
Department issued a temporary regulation that discussed how a tax-
exempt organization shareholder of a PFIC is treated under § 
1291.45 The temporary regulation is now current law, and it reads, 
“If the shareholder of a PFIC is an organization exempt from tax 
under this chapter, § 1291 and these regulations apply to such 
shareholder only if a dividend from the PFIC would be taxable to the 
organization under subchapter F.”46 This particularly short 
regulation exempts tax-exempt organizations from the PFIC tax 
regime. 
 
passive foreign investment companies that are not qualified electing funds, under which U.S. 
shareholders pay tax on certain income or gain realized through the company, plus an interest 
charge that is attributable to the value of deferral. A third set of rules applies to passive foreign 
investment company stock that is marketable, under which electing U.S. shareholders currently 
take into account as income (or loss) the difference between the fair market value of the stock as 
of the close of the taxable year and their adjusted basis in such stock (subject to certain 
limitations), often referred to as ‘marking to market.’” TAX TREATMENT II, supra note 7, at 19–20. 
 42. I.R.C. § 1297 (2012). 
 43. If U.S. shareholders who own at least 10% of a foreign corporation collectively own 
greater than 50% of a foreign corporation, the foreign corporation is classified as a “Controlled 
Foreign Corporation” and is subject to taxation under the rules of Subpart F rather than the 
PFIC regime. See I.R.C. § 1297(d); I.R.S. Instructions for Form 8621 (Dec. 2012), available at 
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/i8621.pdf. The details of Subpart F are beyond the scope of this 
Comment, but the Subpart F rules generally cause a U.S. shareholder to recognize deemed 
dividend income even though the corporation does not actually pay a dividend to the 
shareholder. See I.R.C. § 957. However, in the case of tax-exempt organizations, these deemed 
dividend payments are still exempt from taxation under the UBTI exceptions unless the deemed 
dividends payments are debt-financed. See TAX TREATMENT II, supra note 7, at 10–11; I.R.C. 
§ 512(b). 
 44. See General Rules for Making and Maintaining Qualified Electing Fund Elections, 63 
Fed. Reg. 6 (Jan. 2, 1998). 
 45. See id. 
 46. 26 C.F.R. § 1.1291-1 (2013). A discussion of Subpart F income is beyond the scope of 
this Comment. 
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IV. WHY CONGRESS SHOULD CLOSE THE BLOCKER LOOPHOLE 
Even though the IRS does not consider the blocker loophole 
abusive and has sanctioned its use in tax planning structures,47 
Congress should close this loophole for four main reasons: the 
blocker corporation is an unintended consequence of the UBTI rules, 
the blocker corporation structure fails a substance over form 
analysis, and closing the loophole will provide increased revenue to 
avoid the Fiscal Cliff. 
A. An Unintended Consequence 
The blocker corporation is a loophole that is exploited by tax-
exempt organizations.48 When Congress passed the debt-financed 
income rules in 1969 to prevent sophisticated sale-leaseback 
transactions,49 Congress was attempting to prevent tax-exempt 
organizations from distorting the market. Basically, Congress did not 
want tax-exempt organizations to be a commercial establishment 
without paying the associated income taxes. 
Hedge funds were not as popular of an investment vehicle in the 
1960s and 1970s as they are today. Indeed, hedge funds are not 
specifically mentioned in the legislative history associated with the 
Revenue Act of 1950 or the 1969 debt-financed rules.50 However, 
even though tax-exempt organizations’ investments in hedge funds 
were not mentioned as a target of the legislation, the general idea of 
the legislation is still applicable. If tax-exempt organizations are 
going to invest in a hedge fund, they should have to pay tax on either 
the pass-through UBTI or on the dividend from a corporation that is 
an investor in the fund. 
The foreign blocker loophole is simply an unintended 
consequence of the Revenue Acts of 1950 and 1969. The corporate 
blocker is not popular domestically because of relatively high 
domestic corporate tax rates that would be imposed on the blocker’s 
earnings from the hedge fund. The structure is usually only 
financially beneficial if the blocker corporation is domiciled offshore 
in a low corporate tax jurisdiction. While this particular structure, 
and many other loopholes in the Code, are legal, that does not mean 
they are optimal, necessary, or even warranted. 
 
 47. See Brunson, supra note 2, at 242–45. 
 48. See SELECTED INTERNATIONAL TAX ISSUES, supra note 14, at 68–69. 
 49. See supra Part II.B.1. 
 50. See Brunson, supra note 2, at 246. 
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B. Failing a Substance over Form Analysis 
The blocker corporation fails a substance over form analysis. U.S. 
taxpayers are generally bound by the economic substance of a 
transaction rather than by the transaction’s legal form, meaning that 
a taxpayer will be taxed on the economic reality of a transaction even 
if the form or design of the transaction might indicate otherwise.51 
The UBTI rules were enacted to prevent tax-exempt 
organizations from acting too much like a commercial business and 
to prevent them from distorting the market. With those purposes in 
mind, it makes sense that a tax-exempt organization has an income 
tax liability on income passing through from a hedge fund. A hedge 
fund’s activities are clearly not related to any tax-exempt 
organization’s purpose, which is why the flow through income can 
be taxed as UBTI. 
The blocker corporation loophole allows a tax-exempt 
organization to receive its return on investment from the hedge fund 
as a tax-free dividend instead of UBI. The substance of a tax-exempt 
organization’s investment into a hedge fund is not changed simply 
by inserting a blocker corporation in a zero- or low-tax foreign 
jurisdiction. In both cases, a tax-exempt organization is acting like a 
normal commercial business. The existence of a blocker corporation 
does not change the fact that a tax-exempt organization is still 
ultimately receiving a return on an investment from activities not 
related to the tax-exempt organization’s purpose. The substance (the 
economic reality of receiving a return on an investment from 
unrelated business activity) of both transactions is largely, if not 
completely, the same. By utilizing the loophole, the tax-exempt 
organization avoids tax by merely funneling money through a foreign 
blocker corporation into a hedge fund rather than investing the 
money in the hedge fund directly. The only difference between the 
two investment models is the form or design of the transaction.  
Although U.S. tax law respects corporations as separate legal 
entities52 and the IRS has not labeled the blocker loophole as 
abusive,53 a substance over form analysis is not foreign to the IRS or 
the courts.54 The IRS has routinely challenged certain tax structures 
 
 51. See Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935). 
 52. See SELECTED INTERNATIONAL TAX ISSUES, supra note 14, at 69. 
 53. See Brunson, supra note 2, at 242–45. 
 54. See, e.g., Gregory, 293 U.S. at 467. Gregory is considered one of the landmark 
“substance over form” cases. The case involved a taxpayer that used the business reorganization 
rules under the Code to receive preferential tax treatment on the sale of some shares of stock. 
The taxpayer utilized a transaction structure or form that enabled her to claim such preferential 
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using a substance over form analysis, and Congress has amended 
previous tax laws when they were not actually working as planned.55 
Even though the IRS has sanctioned the blocker loophole, the IRS 
should challenge the substance of the structure. If the IRS does not 
do so, then Congress should change the Code in ways that will be 
outlined later in this Comment. 
Notably, some scholars argue that the blocker corporation 
necessarily changes the substance of the investment because the 
blocker corporation, as a partner of the hedge fund, is liable for the 
debt that the hedge fund incurs when making its investments.56 The 
tax-exempt organization would not be liable for the hedge fund’s 
debt under the blocker structure because of the corporate veil.57 If a 
tax-exempt organization cannot be held liable for the debt, then the 
argument is that the organization should not bear a tax burden 
either. 
Although this argument might seem compelling, there are 
examples in the Code of tax-exempt private foundations being 
required to bear a tax burden based on the receipt of certain 
corporate dividends.58 For example, § 4940 imposes an excise tax on 
investment income, including dividend income that a tax-exempt 
private foundation receives from any source.59 It is true that the 
blocker corporations paying out the dividends would certainly have 
liability for their own debts and that liability would not be able to be 
passed through to the tax-exempt organization shareholder. 
However, the absence of liability for debt has not prevented tax-
exempt private foundations from incurring a tax liability on income 
received from a corporate dividend payout. 
 
treatment, which was technically in conformity with the Code. However, the Commissioner 
argued that the economic substance of the transaction was actually not a business reorganization 
as the taxpayer claimed. Instead, the economic substance of the transaction was a dividend 
payment. The Court ruled in favor of the Commissioner because the newly created corporation 
was “nothing more than a contrivance to the end last described [to receive preferential tax 
treatment]. It was brought into existence for no other purpose; it performed, as it was intended 
from the beginning it should perform, no other function. When that limited function had been 
exercised, it immediately was put to death.” Id. at 469–70. 
 55. See supra Part II.B.1. 
 56. See SELECTED INTERNATIONAL TAX ISSUES, supra note 14, at 69. 
 57. See I.R.C. §§ 11, 301 (2012). 
 58. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 4940 (relating to investment income excise tax). 
 59. Id. 
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C. Increased Revenue to the Treasury 
During the 2012 presidential election, voters listened to the 
presidential candidates talk about closing loopholes and eliminating 
unnecessary deductions and credits found in the Code in order to 
raise additional revenue.60 The charitable tax deduction, mortgage 
interest deduction, and the Child Tax Credit were often discussed 
because many Americans are at least somewhat familiar with these 
issues. Although those particular deductions and credits are certainly 
relevant, tax reform must also include some initiatives aimed at the 
Code’s “mysteries” that are beyond the familiarity of the average 
American voter and not easily printed on a bumper sticker. 
If Congress were to close the blocker loophole, which only 
benefits the wealthiest and most sophisticated tax-exempt 
organizations,61 it would not likely cause too much public criticism 
because many Americans probably do not realize that asset-rich tax-
exempt organizations utilize complex international tax structures to 
avoid an increased tax liability. Hence, Americans might be receptive 
to multi-billion dollar university endowments paying an increased 
tax bill. Moreover, closing loopholes like the foreign blocker 
loophole might be one way for the United States to attempt to rectify 
its massive debt crisis. Although the United States has far from a 
balanced budget, revenue increases seem to be a necessary 
component of a balanced approach to solving the United States’ 
financial woes.62 
V. CLOSING THE LOOPHOLE 
This Comment will now discuss several ways Congress could 
close the blocker loophole. Some suggestions would completely close 
the loophole for all tax-exempt organizations, and others would only 
 
 60. See Transcript of First Presidential Debate, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 3, 2012), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/03/us/politics/transcript-of-the-first-presidential-debate-in-
denver.html?pagewanted=all. 
 61. More often than not, only the wealthy and highly sophisticated taxpayer can afford to 
take advantage of loopholes because professional tax lawyers and accountants are needed to 
perform highly technical readings of the Code and provide written opinions for complex tax 
structures. In additional to a professional opinion from a tax firm, tax payers will often also pay 
the firm to draft private letter rulings from the IRS to ensure the organization will not be 
audited. Typical private letter rulings cost a client around $50,000. See PRIs and Private Letter 
Rulings, AMERICANS FOR COMMUNITY DEV., http://americansforcommunitydevelopment.org/ 
downloads/PRIsAndPrivateLetterRulings.pdf (last visited Dec. 17, 2012). 
 62. See Transcript of First Presidential Debate, supra note 60. In a recent press conference, 
President Barack Obama seemed open to the idea of closing loopholes as a means of raising 
revenue. Id. 
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partially close the loophole with respect to private foundations. This 
Comment argues that the optimal approach is to completely close 
the loophole, given the reasons discussed above. However, partially 
closing the loophole might be the most practical solution 
considering the political realities Congress must deal with while 
enacting tax reform. 
A. Completely Closing the Blocker Loophole 
Although partially closing the blocker loophole is a possibility, 
Congress should completely close the loophole by targeting the core 
parts of the Code that facilitate the loophole: the PFIC rules and the 
UBTI rules. Congress could completely close the blocker loophole by 
amending both the PFIC rules and the UBTI exceptions. 
1. Amend the PFIC rules 
The first step to closing the blocker loophole is for Congress to 
amend the PFIC rules. Although the taxing scheme that applies to 
PFICs63 is beyond the scope of this Comment, it is important to note 
that many foreign blocker corporations will qualify as PFICs under 
§ 1291 by either meeting the income test or asset test, and thus be 
subject to the PFIC tax and interest regime.64 The Regulations, 
however, state that “[i]f the shareholder of a PFIC is an organization 
exempt from tax under this chapter, § 1291 and these regulations 
apply to such shareholder only if a dividend from the PFIC would be 
taxable to the organization under subchapter F.”65 Therefore, the 
PFIC regime generally does not apply to tax-exempt organizations 
receiving dividends from a blocker corporation. 
Congress should strike Treasury Regulation 1.1291-1(e). If this 
specific regulation was amended, tax-exempt organizations, as 
shareholders in foreign blocker corporations, would incur a PFIC tax 
liability. Perhaps the most significant benefit to amending the PFIC 
rules is simplicity. Congress would not need to write new statutory 
language, except perhaps a few words to clarify that a tax-exempt 
organization can indeed be subject to the PFIC regime. 
A tax-exempt organization utilizing the blocker corporation 
would be presented with a choice under the amended PFIC rules: the 
 
 63. TAX TREATMENT II, supra note 7, at 19–20. 
 64. See supra notes 40–42 and accompanying text. 
 65. 26 C.F.R. § 1.1291-1(e)(1) (2013). Although a discussion of Subpart F income is 
beyond the scope of this Comment, one example of taxable Subpart F income to a tax-exempt 
organization is debt-financed income. 
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organization can be subject to the PFIC tax regime or invest directly 
into the hedge fund and pay a tax on the pass-through UBTI from 
the hedge fund. Both choices result in a tax that should eliminate the 
tax benefits of the blocker loophole. 
2. Amend the UBTI exceptions 
The second step to completely closing the blocker loophole is for 
Congress to amend the UBTI rules, which impose a tax on any part 
of a tax-exempt organization’s income that meets the following 
requirements: (1) income received was from a trade or business; (2) 
the trade or business must be “regularly carried on” by the tax-
exempt organization; and (3) the trade or business was not 
“substantially related” to the tax-exempt organization’s purpose.66 
The Code carves out certain exceptions to the UBTI rules, including 
dividends, which consequently, but inadvertently, include dividends 
from blocker corporations.67 Section 512(b)(1) should be amended 
to disallow an exception for dividends paid by foreign corporations 
that are partners in a hedge fund. Section 512(b)(1) currently reads: 
There shall be excluded all dividends, interest, payments with 
respect to securities loans (as defined in subsection (a)(5)), 
amounts received or accrued as consideration for entering into 
agreements to make loans, and annuities, and all deductions 
directly connected with such income.68 
Congress should add a new sentence to the end of the current 
provision which states: 
This section shall not apply to dividends, interest, payments with respect to 
securities loans (as defined in subsection (a)(5)), amounts received or accrued 
as consideration for entering into agreements to make loans, annuities, and all 
deductions directly connected with such income if they are received from a 
foreign corporation that is a partner in a hedge fund. 
The proposed amendment would force tax-exempt organizations that 
use the blocker structure to pay a tax on a dividend received from 
the blocker corporation. As with the proposed PFIC changes, the 
proposed change to § 512(b)(2) offers a tax-exempt organization a 
choice: pay a tax on dividends received from foreign blocker 
corporations or invest directly into the hedge fund and pay an 
 
 66. See I.R.C. §§ 511–13 (2006 & Supp. V 2012). 
 67. Id. § 512(b). 
 68. Id. § 512(b)(1). 
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income tax as a partner of the hedge fund. Both choices result in a 
tax on pass-through UBTI. These choices should deter the use of the 
blocker corporation and keep more capital in the United States, 
which makes sense because many hedge funds’ actual assets are 
located in the United States.69 
B. Partially Closing the Blocker Loophole 
As lawmakers consider closing the blocker loophole, they will 
undoubtedly be met with special interest opposition from tax-
exempt organizations and their lobbyists. Since Congress might not 
be willing to make political enemies with all tax-exempt 
organizations at once, this Comment proposes several solutions to 
partially close the blocker loophole. Admittedly, these suggestions 
would probably not solve the problem, but at least these suggestions 
would start the process. Under the following proposals, Congress 
would increase the § 4940 and § 4944 taxes on private foundations. 
Then, over time, Congress could extend these reforms to all tax-
exempt organizations by amending § 509. 
1. Increase the 4940 excise tax 
One way to close the blocker loophole with respect to tax-
exempt private foundations is to make the § 4940 excise tax steeper. 
Section 4940 states in part: 
There is hereby imposed on each private foundation which is 
exempt from taxation under section 501(a) [26 U.S.C. § 501(a)] for 
the taxable year, with respect to the carrying on of its activities, a 
tax equal to 2 percent of the net investment income of such 
foundation for the taxable year.70 
If private foundations are investing large amounts of money and 
receiving decent returns, a 2% tax amounts to nothing more than a 
small price to pay for doing business unrelated to their tax-exempt 
purposes. Although the legislative history to § 4940 “indicates that 
the purpose of the tax is to raise only enough revenue to finance the 
administration of the code provisions relating to private foundations 
and other tax-exempt organizations,”71 Congress could choose to 
substantially increase the excise tax with respect to dividends paid 
 
 69. See SELECTED INTERNATIONAL TAX ISSUES, supra note 14, at 69. 
 70. I.R.C. § 4940(a) (2012). 
 71. Richard R. Upton, Private Foundations: Many Routine Investment Activities Are Neither 
Subject to the Section 4940 Excise Tax nor to UBIT, 38 EXEMPT ORG. TAX REV. 393, 394 (2002). 
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from blocker corporations. For example, the excise tax on 
investment income received from blocker corporations could be 
equal to the tax-exempt organization’s income tax rate, which would 
effectively put an income tax on the blocker payouts. Thus, § 4940 
could be modified as follows: 
There is hereby imposed on each private foundation which is 
exempt from taxation under section 501(a) [26 U.S.C. § 501(a)] for 
the taxable year, with respect to the carrying on of its activities, a 
tax equal to 2 percent of the net investment income of such 
foundation for the taxable year, unless the investment income is derived 
from a foreign corporation that is a partner in a hedge fund, which would 
then trigger a tax on the foundation’s net investment income from the foreign 
corporation. 
Such a change would effectively remove the tax benefit of the 
blocker loophole because the dividends the foundation receives from 
foreign blockers will not be exempt under the UBTI rules. 
2. Change § 4944 and its corresponding Regulations 
Section 4944 of the Code imposes a 10% tax on investments that 
may jeopardize a private foundation’s tax-exempt purpose.72 The 
Regulations state that 
an investment shall be considered to jeopardize the carrying out of 
the exempt purposes of a private foundation if it is determined that 
the foundation managers, in making such investment, have failed to 
exercise ordinary business care and prudence, under the facts and 
circumstances prevailing at the time of making the investment, in 
providing for the long- and short-term financial needs of the 
foundation to carry out its exempt purposes.73 
Importantly, no category of investments is treated as a per se 
violation of § 4944.74 The Regulations give several examples of 
jeopardizing transactions. Although the blocker structure is not 
described in one of the examples, perhaps the following example is 
somewhat related: 
A is a foundation manager of B, a private foundation with assets of 
$100,000. A approves the following three investments by B after 
taking into account with respect to each of them B’s portfolio as a 
 
 72. I.R.C. § 4944(a)(1) (2012). 
 73. 26 C.F.R. § 53.4944-1(a)(2) (2013). 
 74. Id. 
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whole: (1) An investment of $5,000 in the common stock of 
corporation X; (2) an investment of $10,000 in the common stock 
of corporation Y; and (3) an investment of $8,000 in the common 
stock of corporation Z. Corporation X has been in business a 
considerable time, its record of earnings is good and there is no 
reason to anticipate a diminution of its earnings. Corporation Y has 
a promising product, has had earnings in some years and 
substantial losses in others, has never paid a dividend, and is widely 
reported in investment advisory services as seriously 
undercapitalized. Corporation Z has been in business a short period 
of time and manufactures a product that is new, is not sold by 
others, and must compete with a well-established alternative 
product that serves the same purpose. Z’s stock is classified as a 
high-risk investment by most investment advisory services with the 
possibility of substantial long-term appreciation but with little 
prospect of a current return. A has studied the records of the three 
corporations and knows the foregoing facts. In each case the price 
per share of common stock purchased by B is favorable to B. Under 
the standards of paragraph (a)(2)(i) of this section, the investment 
of $10,000 in the common stock of Y and the investment of $8,000 
in the common stock of Z may be classified as jeopardizing 
investments, while the investment of $5,000 in the common stock 
of X will not be so classified. B would then be liable for an initial 
tax of $500 (i.e., 5 percent of $10,000) for each year (or part 
thereof) in the taxable period for the investment in Y, and an initial 
tax of $400 (i.e., 5 percent of $8,000) for each year (or part thereof) 
in the taxable period for the investment in Z. Further, since A had 
actual knowledge that the investments in the common stock of Y 
and Z were jeopardizing investments, A would then be liable for the 
same amount of initial taxes as B.75 
Judging from the language of the Regulation and its 
corresponding example that labeled investments in companies Y and 
Z as jeopardizing, investments hit with the § 4944 excise tax are 
analyzed on a case-by-case basis. Since no category of investment can 
be a per se violation of this Regulation, the blocker structure, 
especially if it is overseen by sophisticated tax lawyers and 
accountants, is not likely to be subject to this Regulation as written 
unless unusual circumstances are present. 
The Treasury Department should expand the example to include 
a tax-exempt organization investing in a corporate blocker that is a 
 
 75. 26 C.F.R. § 53.4944-1(c) (2013). 
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shareholder in a heavily leveraged hedge fund. The expanded 
example should therefore read: 
A is a foundation manager of B, a private foundation with assets of 
$120,000. A approves the following four investments by B after taking 
into account with respect to each of them B’s portfolio as a whole: 
(1) An investment of $5,000 in the common stock of corporation X; 
(2) an investment of $10,000 in the common stock of corporation 
Y; (3) an investment of $8,000 in the common stock of corporation 
Z; and (4) an investment of $10,000 in the common stock of F, a foreign 
corporation that is a partner in a hedge fund. Corporation X has been in 
business a considerable time, its record of earnings is good and 
there is no reason to anticipate a diminution of its earnings. 
Corporation Y has a promising product, has had earnings in some 
years and substantial losses in others, has never paid a dividend, 
and is widely reported in investment advisory services as seriously 
undercapitalized. Corporation Z has been in business a short period 
of time and manufactures a product that is new, is not sold by 
others, and must compete with a well-established alternative 
product that serves the same purpose. Z’s stock is classified as a 
high-risk investment by most investment advisory services with the 
possibility of substantial long-term appreciation but with little 
prospect of a current return. Corporation F is a foreign corporation that 
primarily invests in hedge funds that engage in leveraged investments. In this 
case, the hedge fund is heavily leveraged. A has studied the records of the 
three corporations and knows the foregoing facts. In each case the 
price per share of common stock purchased by B is favorable to B. 
Under the standards of paragraph (a)(2)(i) of this section, the 
investment of $10,000 in the common stock of Y, the investment of 
$8,000 in the common stock of Z, and the $10,000 investment in the 
common stock of F may be classified as jeopardizing investments, 
while the investment of $5,000 in the common stock of X will not 
be so classified. B would then be liable for an initial tax of $ 500 
(i.e., 5 percent of $10,000) for each year (or part thereof) in the 
taxable period for the investment in Y, an initial tax of $ 400 (i.e., 5 
percent of $8,000) for each year (or part thereof) in the taxable 
period for the investment in Z, and an initial tax of $500 (i.e., 5 percent 
of $10,000 for each year (or part thereof) in the taxable period for the 
investment in F. Further, since A had actual knowledge that the 
investments in the common stock of Y, Z, and F were jeopardizing 
investments, A would then be liable for the same amount of initial 
taxes as B. 
If such an example were included, it would give courts an 
opportunity to rule that excessive leveraging could be a factor in 
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determining a jeopardizing investment. The excise tax could remain 
at 10% because the excise tax is imposed on the value of the 
investment rather than the return on the investment. 
3. Extend the proposed changes to § 4940 and § 4944 to all tax-exempt 
organizations 
Once the proposed changes to § 4940 and § 4944 are 
implemented, Congress should then extend the changes to all tax-
exempt organizations. The most efficient way for Congress to 
accomplish the extension of § 4940 and § 4944 to all tax-exempt 
organizations is to amend § 509, which is the section that defines 
“private foundation.”76 Congress should add a subpart to § 509 that 
reads, “Any organization that normally would not be defined as a 
private foundation will be considered a private foundation with 
respect to dividends received from a foreign corporation that is a 
partner in a hedge fund and with respect to investments made into a 
foreign corporation that is a partner in a hedge fund.” 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Tax-exempt organizations should not be able to receive tax-free 
dividends from foreign blocker corporations that invest in hedge 
funds for three reasons: the blocker corporation is an unintended 
consequence of the UBTI rules, the blocker corporation structure 
fails a substance over form analysis, and closing the loophole will 
provide increased revenue to the United States Treasury. With those 
reasons in mind, Congress should close the blocker loophole using 
one of two strategies. Perhaps the most practical strategy is for 
Congress to increase the excise taxes on private foundations and 
then apply those excise taxes to all other tax-exempt organizations 
over time. Ideally, Congress should completely close the blocker 
loophole for all tax-exempt organizations by amending PFIC and 
UBTI rules. In the meantime, tax-exempt organizations will continue 
to utilize the blocker loophole and invest in unrelated business 
activities abroad with minimal income tax consequences. 
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